The Salesian Center for Faith and Culture presents

Ethical Action in an Age of Globalization

A public lecture in the “Visiting Salesian Scholar” series
by

James F. Cryan, O.S.F.S.

April 26, 2004
1. GLOBALIZATION AND ITS CRITICS

Globalization is the process of humanity's converging into a single system of economic and cultural interactions. It began thousands of years ago, but today's electronic access is causing the process to accelerate at an unprecedented pace. Richard Richter sees the term "globalization" operating something like a Rorschach inkblot test. In approaching it, we tend to describe what our inner leanings and prior assumptions lead us to see. 1

1.1 ENTHUSIASTS AND CASANDRAS

1.1.1 CHRISTOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

Many Catholic enthusiasts for the process share the optimism of a Jesuit paleontologist, Teilhard de Chardin, who saw planetary evolution in terms of successive compressions and convergences, with the emergence of humanity as earth's most complex phenomenon, being drawn through social convergences towards omega point, the cosmic Christ who is the affective and spiritual nucleus of all social coherence.

The Catholic Church's pastoral constitution, *Gaudium et Spes*, reflects the optimism and perhaps the influence of Teilhard de Chardin. It places social concern within a Christological understanding of human history.2

History itself is accelerating on so rapid a course that individuals can scarcely keep pace with it.... And so the human race is passing from a relatively static conception of the nature of things to a more dynamic and evolutionary conception (*Gaudium et Spes* §5).

---


This optimism is reflected in John Paul's addresses:

Globalization, for all its risks, offers exceptional and promising opportunities, precisely with a view to enabling humanity to become a single family, built on the values of justice, equity and solidarity. 
(World Day of Peace, 2000)

That optimism, a faith in ultimate purpose, comes from the belief that underlying the rapid transformations in technology and the transformation of human history, Christ simultaneously pervades and transcends history and that this truth provides the key, center and purpose of the whole history of mankind (Gaudium et Spes §20-21) and guidance for discerning globalization's meaning.

1.1.2 THE SPECTRE OF SOCIAL DARWINISM

The Casandras, however, view the optimism less mystically. They see Social Darwinism as the economic engine that is driving globalization into the future: there are winners and losers in humanity's progress, and it is inevitable that somebody will be a loser. Globalization is asymmetrical. The Casandras see the electronic herd trampling the turtles as it races towards material prosperity.

John Paul II speaks of globalization first as a human phenomenon that is neither bad nor good but is what people will make of it. (April 27, Address to the Pontifical Academy for Social Sciences). Globalization is a human event, a sign of our times, in which we must discover its "positive aspects" and "avoid its dangers. (Address to University Congress, April 9, 2001)

There are, then, ethical caveats:

The globalization of the economy and of finance is now a reality, and we are realizing more and more clearly the effects of the rapid progress related to information technologies. We are on the threshold of a new era which is the bearer of great hopes and disturbing questions. (XXXI World Day for Peace.)
1.2. ECONOMICS AND CULTURE

1.2.1. GLOBALIZATION IS ABOUT MORE THAN ECONOMICS

Political sentiment in the United States is highly polarized over the relationship between economics and culture. Does a culture determine an economy, or does a particular economy determine a particular culture. Are some cultures morally or genetically disposed to be winners or losers? The arguments are usually simplistic and they rapidly polarize into political partisanships. David Shipler's recent study, The Working Poor cogently observes that the poor need more than welfare in the contemporary pace of high technology and competition, which brings us to the heart of the matter.

Globalization is about more than economics. It is as much about expanding personal relationships beyond family, local communities, and even nations. Humans are social, and as we become aware of other cultures we are drawn to commune with them.

The media may create an economic market for Darjeeling tea, toe rings, silk sari bedding and chicken curry, but it was not the market that aroused interest forty years ago in Hermann Hesse's Siddhartha, Iron Butterfly's In-A-Gadda-Da-Gavida and the garment industry's paisley prints, and today it is not the market that creates the audience for Deepak Choprac.

1.2.2. THE TEMPTATION TO DEMONIZE GLOBALIZATION

It is facile to describe globalization as the cultural imposition of the west on the rest of the world. Coca-Cola hires fifty full-time cultural anthropologists to determine what pushes the buttons of a local culture. Industry does not want to impose; it wants to engage. We are not likely to see a Mickey Mouse become the Colossus of Tiananmen Square.

What attracts or repels us in another culture defies analysis. Was the suburbanite high school student who carried his dog-eared copy of Che Guevara's
Diary to class every day in the 1970's impressed with the doctor's passionate altruism, or was he making an adolescent protest against his parents' economic mobility or developing an awareness that there are alternative social systems?

Does the Namibian teenager who pulls a Michael Jordan T-shirt from the mission hamper actually prefer basketball to soccer? Or is the logo a fetish connecting him with the mystique of foreign power?3

Today's collegiate who interacts with diaspora students from the mid-east would be mystified by General Schwartzkopf's demonizing argument that Arabs are a different humanity. Intrigue with what is culturally different stimulates the imagination towards cognitive complexity. Normally we are not violent towards those we are engaged with.

On the other hand, the human imagination is at times captive to commodity capitalism. 4 An unemployed automotive worker in Detroit may take a baseball bat to a Toyota, or worse, to the local Asian dry-cleaner. But this does not give us reason to demonize capitalism. John Paul II describes the globalization of the economy and finance now as a reality and "while it brings disturbing questions, it is the bearer of great hopes. (Address: "XXXI World Day for Peace").

It would appear that, on the level of individual nations and of international relations, the free market is the most efficient instrument for utilizing resources and effectively responding to needs (Centesimus Annus § 34)...

3 ROBERT SCHREITER. The New Catholicity. Theology between the Global and Local (Orbis Books, 1998) p. 10, highlights such possibility as indicating the encroachment of the socially, politically and economically foreign into the world of tradition, culture and local identity.

4 ARJUN APPADURAI'S Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2003), 106ff where he speaks of the commodification of Indian cricket. Later he explains that the phenomenon of global violence and ethnic cleansing as beyond the issues of commodification, and also beyond economic jealousies. Such violence may be attributed to the disorientation that accompanies apprehension of annihilation, the loss of cultural meaning.
"certainly the mechanisms of the market offer secure advantages: they help to utilize resources better; they promote the exchange of products; above all they give central place to the person's desires and preferences, which, in a contract, meet the desires and preferences of another person" (*Centesimus Annus* § 40).

That being the case, why the ravages of Seattle and Milan?

The most severe critics of globalization are not the Luddites who want to throw away the constraints of modern society, throw computers out of windows and go back to a simplistic way of life. Most often they are economists, philanthropists, and investors who look at the global picture and say that something is out of sync, that the free market system is worthwhile but it is not being used well.

Thomas Pogge writes, "It is bad luck to be born into a family that is too poor to feed one. But the fact that a quarter of all children are born into such families is not bad luck but bad organization." Ethical action in the age of globalization has to do with the rightness of how we organize.

---

2. THE ETHICAL CHALLENGE

2.1. LIBERAL AND NEO-LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC ETHICAL THEORY

The ethical issues in globalization of the economy reflect the tension found in the two currently dominant theories of justice: Liberal Democratic and Marxist-Leninist.

The neo-liberal democratic argument holds the most essential issue in the ethical order is human freedom. Unless I am injuring someone, I have a right to freedom from your coercion. Human rights are defensive and are expressed negatively.

The argument runs something like this: "I acknowledge that social and economic inequities exist, but your right to housing, food or work comes after my right to increased productivity for your benefit. Those secondary rights will have to be arranged so that the greatest benefit accrues to the least advantaged through fair opportunity."

This argument, following John Rawls, makes a judgment about the capacity and flexibility of political and economic institutions. It does not deny that food, housing, clothing and cultural identity are essential for the dignified life. But its proponents have made a judgment that human persons are better served with priority granted to personal liberty and immunity from interference.

That theory acknowledges that every human has an equal right to the most extensive system of basic liberties: political liberty, the right to vote, to free speech, to hold personal property. The poor have these rights also.

---

7 HOLLENBACH, 19.
8 One has to be cautious in criticizing Rawls who, after all, defines society as "a vast system for distributing shares." Paul Ricoeur's appreciation of Rawls is that Rawls describes justice and love as mutually dependent. It is through just social institutions that I love my neighbor as myself, but this is the love called agape which makes no demands on the beloved. Translating
2.1.1. CRITICISM

Critics of this theory say this is like telling the poor that they are free to eat at the Four Seasons like anyone else. The theory does not say how the distribution of liberty, wealth, income and self-respect takes place.

Defenders of the theory respond that poverty and affluence are relative concepts in a pluralist society. "You cannot say that my defensive freedom is not raising the level of civilization, so I can question the legitimacy of your restricting my negative or defensive freedom.

2.1.2. SANDEL’S CRITIQUE

The failure of the neo-liberal theory lies deeper than partisan allegiances to liberal or conservative positions. Michael Sandel, professor of government at Harvard University, sees a shift in America’s political and legal history from the politics of citizenship to a politics of growth, a loss of a communitarian view of liberty in favor of the power of personal choice based, he finds, on economic change. (Democracy and its Discontents) The left cries, "The government may not interfere with my reproductive rights," and the right cries, "The government may not interfere with my economic rights," yet neither position claims liberty for anything. The government must remain morally neutral on abortion rights and on economic outcomes while providing a framework for rights and entitlements for individual choice. 9 Such arguments do not appeal to

"comprehensive moral ideals." In a society, much more in a world, where the rich and the poor live separate lives, without a comprehensive moral ideal that addresses a common life and a politics oriented to the common good, the civic character of public life is corrupted. Without communal vision, society is organized by economic power and individual (non-civic) pursuits.

2.2. MARX-LENINIST OPTION

The other dominant ethical argument is Marxist. It stresses positive entitlements to full participation in the public sphere. Individual freedom and social freedom must be realized together, yet the theorists have made the judgment that the distribution of the instruments of power are along class lines and that this leads to exploitation and oppression. Priority, therefore, is given to overcoming those class lines by restriction. Civil and political rights are engineered by the State.

2.2.1. CRITICISM OF MARX-LENINIST ETHICS

Critics of this argument hold that it confuses values with the means to institutionalize those values. Consequently you have a State without a society since there is no actual social participation, only totalitarian control so long as society is pluralist.

Critics of both theories, Thomas Mittelman in particular, hold that both arguments are similar since they both come from the Enlightenment and are based on a premise of Utopian society. In the Enlightenment view, sound reasoning and humanitarian engagement move society towards a monoculture interpreted as universalism. (Neo-liberal economists claim that laissez-faire economics hasten this. Opponents, however, claim that the transformation of society through convergence is accelerating through electronic media, not through economics. Still others claim that if an economic system creates a true hegemony, it more likely to promote plurality of cultures. And still others hold
that this is a moot observation since currently the only hegemony is the United States.\textsuperscript{10}

Neither Marxist-Leninist nor Liberal-Democratic arguments demonstrate that their positions protect both individual liberty and social participation. Neither explores the possibility that such protection does not have to violate civil and political liberties.

2.3. THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The United Nations drafted The Universal Declaration of Human Rights to address the tension between these two arguments; it is a proposal about human rights that includes both negative immunity and public participation. While The Universal Declaration is not a "magisterial" document, its chief architect was Jacques Maritain, the most articulate spokesman for Roman Catholicism's social justice teaching in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.

Its thesis is simple. Rights are not only claims \textit{against} other persons but claims \textit{on the community as a whole}. Everyone has duties to the community because it is only in community that the free and full development of the personality is possible.

The Declaration is not binding or subject to legal enforcement. It serves chiefly as an educational tool.

The Human Rights covenants that covered social and economic rights as well as civil and political rights were not ratified by the United States. The argument for not signing it was that ratification would infringe on our sovereignty. It would make us accountable, for instance, to international courts of justice for war crimes\textsuperscript{11}. It would obligate us to support the return of refugees to their homeland if their country of origin is an ally who didn't want them back.

\footnote{R. RICHTER, on Mittleman (supra)}

\footnote{In fact, we have sanctions against those non-NATO nations that did sign that article.}
There were objections to the Declaration for reasons other than *realpolitik*. Some critics questioned the validity of right to life implications. They hold that "the right to sustainable life" (a right to minimum amount of food, shelter, education) is not a right at all, but an ideal of great social importance but impossible to attain.

Critics of these objectors claim that this is sophistry. What are we talking about when we say we have "a right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness?" Would anyone want a non-sustainable life? Because the ideals of a right to a minimum amount of food, shelter and education cannot be realized by legal fiat it does not mean that the right to sustainable life cannot be realized by other forms of implementation.

2.4. THE STRUCTURE OF ETHICAL THEORY

Ethical principles are normative even though they do not entail a specific social or political program, but they are not mere exhortations. They are the limits and directives that shape the conscience of responsible agents.

Ethical principles come from synthesizing historical interpretation and basic value commitments. (1) Anthropology identifies what values we are committed to. (2) Historical circumstance provides the catalyst for the synthesis.

2.4.1 ANTHROPOLOGICAL BASE: *OMNIS HOMO RES SACRA*

The most consistent value that we find in Catholic anthropology is the transcendental dignity of the human person. It has been expressed many ways: "The Sacred Icon," "Man the Divine Image," which Fathers Pocetto and Langelaan have explored in Salesian anthropology; "Man the Transcendent" is a term used in many current documents.
Towards the end of the second century, before they threw him to the lions, Iranaeus de Lyon shouted into the amphitheater, "Omnis homo res sacra," "Mankind is sacred." Not "Christianus res sacra," but "Omnis homo." "Every human is a sacrament."

This is not an ethical principle. It is an anthropological truth from which we can derive ethical principles.

Is that sectarian? Are we approaching ethics with a religious bias? Is it even possible to claim a universalist anthropology, or are we, as some post-modernists claim, merely lusting for raw power and using our anthropology to suit our agenda?

The best way to answer that is to recognize that whatever model of human community anyone chooses will determine which rights get priority in social policy.

Catholic anthropology which speaks of God's love for the world drawing humanity together, love exemplified and realized in Jesus Christ, provides a concept of human love that is ethically normative.¹²

Not everyone shares our faith, yet Catholic anthropology is distinct in holding that "the fall" did not totally disorient us. Acknowledging that we are wounded and broken, our reason is still intact. Because we live in a world of moral, political and both religious and secular pluralism, we who come from a two millennia history of a variety of cultures and social, political and economic systems, have an experience that makes us interesting participants when interacting with the relevant findings of non-Christian thinkers and writers on the social, political, and economic life of man, and the lessons they have learned from their experience. ¹³

¹² HOLLENBACH, 108

This provides us the experience to reach general ethical conclusions with others about food, clothing, shelter, creativity, participative voice, family, culture work and what other components people accepting human responsibility engage in.

2.4.2 HISTORICAL CATALYST

Unless the relation between the anthropological value (the transcendent value of persons) and the particular material, interpersonal and social and particular structures of human existence can be specified, we have an empty notion. The relationship has to be specified and this has been a priority in the Church’s agenda since Leo XIII. 14

In 1891 in response to growing industrialization, Leo XIII derives the principle that transcendence indicates that man is not an instrument of labor. Human dignity supercedes the state and the employer and defines certain rights; namely, to organize and to participate in the benefits of labor.

In 1931, in response to the success of the Bolshevik revolution, growing Fascism and the world depression, Pius XI carried the theme of transcendence a step further. He identified human transcendence as a social process of free agents shaping their economic and institutional relationships. For example, the right to private property has a moral dimension of protecting personal self-determination and self-determination is the means by which a society organizes itself to fulfill basic human needs.

By 1942 Pius XII made this principle even more specific: Society does not confer human dignity. Society is a dynamic of persons who are transcendent and who act interactively in responsibility to that recognized dignity and organize social structures accordingly.

14 I follow HOLLENBACH’s structure 1890-1961.
The theme of transcendence had become very refined within those fifty years, using historical circumstance to make the anthropological value more specific. While this development occurred logically, almost organically, some immense leaps were made in Catholic social theory.

Leo XIII, for instance, who defined human dignity for the age of industry, had seen human nature as somewhat static, a dignity that must be defended by a benevolent state, which he saw also as a somewhat static, hierarchical institution. That concept evolved into the state's being seen as a dynamic engagement of responsible agents.

Likewise, few people would find much kinship between Pius IX, Leo's predecessor, and Michel Foucault, but Pio Nono's fear that the democracy of French liberalism was no more than the tyranny of the majority, is not far from Foucault's analysis of power-lust. If Pius IX was driven into reactionary postures, he was historically close enough to the succession of collapsed governments that followed the civil blood-bath of the revolution to be suspicious of what paraded as democracy. Leo XIII ended that and opened the way to dialogue with the modern democratic theory of interactive participation.

By the 1960's, colonies were claiming self-determination and the growth of literacy in nation-states accelerated political participation. Even before internet, other forms of technology were making the world more informed and more aware of itself globally and more aware of the complexity of interdependence in international affairs. It fell to John XXIII to face the post-modern challenge and provide a vigorous defense of human dignity and human rights in the post-colonial world.

In 1961 his Mater et Magistra enunciated the principle that the sacredness of the human is the sacredness of the social. While robustly affirming the sacredness of the individual, he stated that moral responsiveness to the claim of human sacredness will be mediated through social structures.
3. **THE ETHICAL MOMENT: THINK GLOBAL, NOT INTERNATIONAL**

The full implications of human dignity cannot be known or affirmed apart from concrete conditions of an historical epoch. These implications are not a priori principles (*Gaudium et Spes*), but our ethics are "relativist." The value of sacredness is a constant, but the social, economic and political conditions demanded by the sacred keep shifting. What *Gaudium et Spes* describes as "the signs of the times" tells us how to specify where we are to enter into the creativity which is ours by nature.

After John XXIII, Paul VI expanded this concept of human well-being beyond economic definitions (*Populorum Progressio* §14-18). If human transcendence can be identified as the capacity for self-determination and initiative, such human capacity can be achieved only through social collaboration. In such a case, as Maritain elaborated on fifty years earlier, "the common good" is not a minimum standard of economic well-being, but one's engagement in the progress of the culture. There can be a plurality of responses. (1971 *Synod of Bishops.*)

3.1. **THE EMERGENCE OF THE MARKET STATE**

What is disconcerting to many critics of globalization is not the growing complexity of modern trade, but the shift in agency. The nation-state seems to be moving into obsolescence. The city-states of the ancient republics were able to manage their independence and their mutual dependencies under the directive hegemonies of culturally designed leadership, as were the nation-states that began their appearance four hundred years ago came to fruition in the 19th century. Today, however, we have a growing sense that we are witnessing the demise of the nation-state and experiencing the birth pains of the market state. If this is happening, where will we find the ethical moment? Within the state or within the private sector?

In the 1960's the Church recognized that the internationalizing of economic relations created
a growing economic interdependence among States. National economies are gradually becoming so interdependent that a kind of world economy is being born from the simultaneous integration of the economies of individual States (*Pacem in Terris* §130).

Whether such integration sounds the end of the nation-state as we have known it is beyond the scope of this paper, but the issue does provide a strategic dilemma for devising programs and policies based on Roman Catholic ethical principles. John XXIII came to the conclusion that strategic planning for the common good of all peoples was beyond the resources, authority and influence of the nations. There were global difficulties that could not be solved except by "a public authority with power, organization and means co-extensive with these problems and with a world-wide sphere of activity." (*Pacem in Terris* §135-137).

John Paul II is more cautious in addressing the issue of strategic planning. Rather than speak of a need for new institutions, he prefers to talk of reforming existing ones. He uses the same balance and restraint he exercised when describing globalization as morally neutral, of being what people will make of it, with great possibilities and yet with grave risks. But if anyone needs to know what issues must be addressed, John Paul is relentless in identifying where institutions have failed, have deepened the chasm between the powerful and the marginalized, have diminished cultures and have taken advantage of foreign markets for private gain (*Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* §43).

Like John XXIII, he sees that not even the most powerful State on earth is in a position to guide the increasing internationalization of the economy towards the common good, yet he believes that international evaluation of the consequences of decisions on the lives of the marginalized, those who are not ball-players, is a possibility (*Centesimus Annus* §58).

These decisions that affect the lives of the marginalized are made largely by corporations, not by States. In a State where the government must remain morally neutral on economic outcomes while providing a framework for rights and entitlements for individual choice, arguments for "international evaluation of
the consequences of decisions on the lives of the marginalized" are not appealing. Such states are without "comprehensive moral ideals," as Michael Sandel has implied. In a society where the rich and the poor live separate lives, without a comprehensive moral ideal that addresses a common life and a politics oriented to the common good, the civic character of public life is corrupted.

The issue of the relationship between the private sector and juridic decisions in a free society is thorny. Rather than revisit it, John Paul has begun with the themes of "the universal common good," "humanity as a single family," "globalization in solidarity," "a new culture of international solidarity," "the centrality of the human person," and "the universal destiny of created goods." He has created a collage of themes which are attractive enough to stimulate thought about the common good and civility, as Sandel speaks of it, and to support ethical choice for responsible people. I suspect that such support will happen first among the NGOs.

3.2. THE FUTURE OF THE NATION-STATE

The future of the nation-state is beyond the scope of this paper, but it bears importance on the ethical direction of non-governmental organizations which are non-territorial and often are able to accomplish what the state cannot. The most articulate proponent of the demise of the nation-state is Philip Bobbitt whose Hobbesian thesis, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Law and the Course of History*, describes the nation-state as deriving its legitimacy from promising material welfare, especially security and order, by force and law, with war serving as the natural corrective to political and economic institutional shifts that follow ideological decline.

He sees the traditional territorial markers of nation-states challenged by modern communication, global migration (refugees, economic displacement, social diaspora) and organizations that have no single territorial bases. The nation-state no longer serves its purpose; it is outdated. Human rights are no longer determined by internal laws; thus we have legitimized our interventions. Territorial borders are no longer a guarantee of sovereignty. (The two great
world wars of the past century, for instance, were between unified and centralized states. Even the cold war had identifiable centers that promised security and welfare, but today's state is confronted with wars that have no identifiable territorial enemy, nor is any state able to defend itself from weapons of mass destruction which make territorial boundaries useless. If we are to avoid mass annihilations, there must be coalitions.

The state is not able to control the economy (except by protectionism) and, as Bobbitt describes it, there is "a grotesque disparity between the rapid movement of international capital and the ponderous and territorially circumscribed responses of the nation-state, as clumsy as a bear chained to a stake, trying to chase a shifting beam of light." Capital moves faster than a government within a territorial border and this is what determines how a territorial government must provide service to its citizens.

A government may try to provide the services of security to its territorially circumscribed people while dominating the market, but often, in the interests of economic hegemony, it goes to bed with a tyrant while declaiming tyrannies. This is the sort of thing that produces epochal wars. Bobbitt's future is not bright.

The tendency is that a government without civil policy is to keep opening opportunities for growth rather than legislate common participation.

Bobbitt's thesis is heavy (900 pages) and hardly comforting, but he does underscore the imperative for making ethical choices and for supporting the changing roles of non-governmental organizations, private sector philanthropies and special interest lobbies to face international events that governments cannot control.

4. THE UNIVERSAL COMMON GOOD

By now it should be evident that ethical action is derived by a constellation of principles that cluster around a basic commitment to the value of human
transcendence. The principles are normative. They are guidelines shaping the conscience, tools for discernment, and they should be found in any social or political plan, but they are not programs. Still, they are not mere homiletic exhortations like "let us be caring people." Undoubtedly Attila the Hun told Mrs. Atilla, "Ich bin ein caring Mensch" when he fell asleep at night. Who wants to be considered uncaring?

The ethical teaching of the Catholic Church, most forcibly in John Paul's teaching on the phenomenology of the human person, has defined "caring" as a principle of authenticity to the degree that it enables people to participate in the creativity which is theirs by nature, something that is due them, not as a gesture of benevolent regard, as Kant well understood (where "the benevolent will" masks subjugation as "altruism").

The "common good" is not a set of commodities, like good roads, school supplies, running water, although certainly such goods can be a bench-mark of how well a people are on their way to creating a chosen future. It includes as much

the sum or sociological integration of all the civic conscience, political virtues and sense of right and liberty, of all the activity, material prosperity and spiritual riches, of unconsciously operative hereditary wisdom, of moral rectitude, justice, friendship, happiness, virtue and heroism in the individual lives of its members. For these things all are, in a certain measure, communicable and so revert to each member, helping him to perfect his life and liberty of person. They all constitute the good human life of the multitude.\(^{15}\)

4.1 ETHICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE THEORY

While the definition of the Common Good is rhetorically appealing, John Paul's Apostolic Exhortation, *The Church in America* (1999) challenges facile or benign complacency. He puts teeth in the concept:

If globalization is ruled merely by the laws of the market applied to suit the powerful, the consequences cannot but be negative. These are, for example, the absolutizing of the economy, unemployment, the reduction and deterioration of public services, the destruction of the environment and natural resources, the growing distance between the rich and the poor, unfair competition which puts the poor nations in a situation of ever increasing inferiority." (§ 20)

The Church in America is called ... to cooperate with every legitimate means in reducing the negative effects of globalization, such as the domination of the powerful over the weak, especially in the economic sphere, and the loss of the values of local cultures in favor of a misconstrued homogenization. (§. 55)

More and more, in many countries of America, a system known as ‘neoliberalism’ prevails; based on a purely economic conception of man, this system considers profit and the laws of the market as its only parameters, to the detriment of the dignity of and the respect due to individuals and peoples. At times this system has become the ideological justification for certain attitudes and behavior in the social and political spheres leading to the neglect of the weaker members of society. Indeed, the poor are becoming ever more numerous, victims of specific policies and structures which are often unjust. (§ 56)
4.2 ALTRUISM AND THE ETHICS OF NEOLIBERALISM

Neoliberalism has its defenders. Few have been more aggressive than Jagdish Bhagwati at Columbia University whose *In Defense of Globalization* (Oxford University Press, 2004) takes on everything globalization is blamed for from child labor to environmental degradation, cultural homogenization, women's rights, democracy, and wage and labor standards. In a book dedicated to loved ones that comes "from affection and indulgence" we expect to see the promised "human face of globalization", if not with the great detail that he proposes, at least in broad outlines that might interface with some of the themes we have been observing, especially when the author concludes that by our focusing so much on globalization's purported evils, we are missing the opportunity to focus on accelerating its achievements while coping with its downsides.

4.2.1 THE ABSENCE OF DISCERNABLE ETHICAL STRUCTURE

The book does not deliver. Bagwati's argument is well written, if one appreciates the truncated and often glib arguments we find in op-ed contributions to journals. It is the absence of ethical structure that is unnerving. He reduces, for instance, Joseph Stiglitz's argument that the IMF's conditionality (that a member country must opt for trade liberalization to gain access to IMF funding) to a strange *ad hominem* argument, that IMF egos are helium filled balloons which when wined and dined in penthouse executive suites, surrounded by the sycophantic obeisance of presidents and prime-ministers, they capitulate on principle (pp. 255-259). That may be true, of course, but Stiglitz's argument in *Globalization and its Discontents* asks question that remain unanswered (see below), and Bhagwati never says what the principle is the executives capitulate on other than profit diminishment.

4.2.2 WOMEN, FAMILY, AND ETHICAL STRUCTURE

The displacement of women and the elderly in the labor force is also summarily dismissed. If one is drawing a six-digit salary among the academes of the Upper West Side New York, social diaspora might be exciting. But what of
families whose homes on the barriers islands of the south must be given up in consequence of the tax increases that follow recreational land development and must move into the brick ovens of the city? What of the elderly in the Cook Islands whose children lose their employment when corporations move to New Zealand or Australia? Do employees follow the corporation, bringing family with them leaving island culture and custom behind, or leaving the elderly behind? Bhagwati believes that this is a first world issue where "the nuclear family has become dominant." The nuclear family is "often alien to the culture of the poor countries with their extended families," he insists. Even if one pays attention "naively only to psychological [sic] consequences," he adds, many women are better off in the global care chain "than suffering from emotional 'deficit' and distress" (pp. 76-77). Bhagwati has not been talking with the elderly of Rorotonga that I've come to know. Rather than disrupt family ties, they have opted to abandon their homes to move with their children and become aliens into a culture foreign to them. How inconsequential are psychological consequences? What are the ethical concerns?

_In Defense of Globalization_ intends to be a substantive argument that neoliberalism is profitable, but the absence of an appeal to ethics is disturbing. Bhagwati's argument is that globalization is "the competitive advantage of international trade." What we get cheaper elsewhere lowers costs and therefore boosts demand for our products (they are cheaper). Higher demand means economic growth, more production and better living. Protectionism destroys this.

Dislocation of place and loss of culture is acknowledged, but he feels this can be remedied by research and education which advances us to the cutting edge of new industries which will provided better and more profitable employment—somewhere, sometime.

I have not seen the towns in Ohio that have fallen to dislocation on the cutting edge of anything. Nor do I see what profits that have accrued to former employers alleviating the financial distress of the turtles still trying to cross the Ohio's roads.
I am aware that there are great theories of economics, as I am aware that a good billiards player who with the right amount of force and the precise delivery of english can hit the apex ball with the cue ball on the break shot and theoretically deliver each ball into an appropriate pocket. I am distressed, however, that the economics seems to be played with elliptical balls on a torn felt with a warped cue stick held by college sophomores who have had too many beers.

I am more distressed that failure to pocket the balls is so summarily dismissed.

4.2.3. CHILD LABOR AND ETHICAL STRUCTURE

A final case in point is child labor.

Bhagwati's *In Defense of Globalization* acknowledges that selling children across borders into slavery or into child prostitution is a caveat to his optimism, but that these are "the products of globalization only in the sense that there are profits to be had in movements across borders." He acknowledges that "these developments call for corrective action" (p. 77), which perhaps suggests moral magnanimity on his part, but it leaves the disturbing question about what his attitude would be if the slave-trade were not across borders, and it suggests that child prostitution might be ameliorated with more free trade. He locates this crime chiefly in Saudi Arabia, which indicates that he may not familiar with current reports of the UNHR Commission.

Whether trade sanctions are or are not a remedy to child slavery is not in question here, but his comparison of sanctions against countries with child-labor regulation to the Church's use of the rack to turn Spain's Jews into Christians is more bizarre than offensive (p. 250).

The issue is not whether or not sanctions are the most effective way of addressing human rights abuses, but what ethics are involved. He acknowledges that "many activists act out of altruistic motives and have little sympathy for
competitiveness outcomes" but the intrusion of protectionist motivation makes the use of trade sanctions less than credible.

Is this condescending reference to altruism a sop tossed to those who question child labor? Or does the neoliberal argument dismiss altruism altogether? Bhagwati moves his argument towards the efficacy of sanctions, not towards ethics, admitting that coercive suasion must be subject to ethical rules. He prefers that international organizations and NGOs do not interfere with the internal laws of trade. One thinks of Charles Luwanga's martyrdom for opposing the homosexual rape of Christian catechists to which Neville Hoad has written that this was colonial interference in tribal custom and should have been left alone.

If Bhagwati's thesis is *A Defense of Globalization*, his arguments should have been better developed. He claims that the Harkin Bill (1993) designed by "the well known liberal" [*sic*] which would have banned imports of textiles using child labor, sent 50,000 Bangladesh children from factories and some into "'occupations' such as prostitution."

His argument states that child labor liberates children and is not exploitative. On the contrary, congressmen who present child labor in terms of exploitation are generally seeking constituency sponsorship to restrict imports that help American firms compete better (p. 245). In his view, the moral conscience of the congress is not about the ethics of child labor but about labor forces worried about competition.

He compares this tactic to anti-abortionists who flood the media with photos of aborted fetuses to exclude the refined nuances of the abortion debates (p. 245).

I have failed to find the refined nuances in his thesis. Is this the best ethical argument our nation's economists can offer us?16

---

4.3  THE PONTIFICAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

The ethical principles that have developed in modern Roman Catholic social thought in the past hundred and twenty years were summarily applied to globalization by John Paul II in his Address to the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, 27 April 2002.

4.3.1 PRINCIPLES INVOKED

Briefly stated, the principles are: No system is an end in itself. Globalization, like any system must serve the human person (understood as we have described participative creativity and self-determination), human solidarity and the common good.

Inclusivity can be realized only by a conscious effort at solidarity. The goal is globalization in solidarity, globalization without marginalization. The first principle in assuring this is "the inalienable value of the human person, source of all human rights and every social order. The human being must always be an end and not a means, a subject and not an object, nor a commodity of trade."

For such a common effort, "As humanity embarks upon the process of globalization, it can no longer do without a common code of ethics... This does not mean a single dominant socio-economic system or culture which would impose its
values and its criteria on ethical reasoning. It is within man as such, within universal humanity sprung from the Creator's hand, that the norms of social life are to be sought. In all the variety of cultural forms, universal human values exist, and they must be brought out and emphasized as the guiding force of all development and progress".

"Globalization must not be a new version of colonialism. It must respect the diversity of cultures which, within the universal harmony of peoples, are life's interpretative keys. In particular, it must not deprive the poor of what remains most precious to them, including their religious beliefs and practices, since genuine religious convictions are the clearest manifestation of human freedom."

It is here, in the specter of a new version of colonialism, that John Paul begins to make his plea for allying politics and economy to safeguard the potential victims of globalization processes. More specifically, he already called for the alleviation of the heavy burden of foreign debt of developing countries that has held them in bondage to a fluctuating market they could not control. He had already referred to subsidies granted to chosen states that made them market competitors to the exclusion of countries whose limited resources prevent them from competition. And it is here in this address that he makes an impassioned plea for legislation against child labor.

4.1 ETHICAL PRINCIPLES MOVING TO STRATEGY

Ethical principles are normative. They are guidelines shaping the conscience, tools for discernment, but they are not programs. And while they are derived from a distinctively religious anthropology, they should be found in any social or political program. We believe that they are appealing to responsible people everywhere who reflect on their own experience and apply them to their own social and political efforts. I wish to offer examples of two directions this may take, one regarding innovative strategy and another which is reformist.
4.1.1 ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND INOVATIVE STRATEGY

Martha Nussbaum who teaches ethics and law at the University of Chicago avoids invoking God or "objective reality" in her arguments lest anyone sidetrack her in postmodern debates.

She is a vigorous proponent of the natural law theory and non-relative virtue an Aristotelian who believes that philosophical principles should inform public policy. Entering the debate of globalization she rejects free-market fundamentalism and unexamined cultural relativism, and addresses the question of what is needed to assist people to thrive and under what conditions do they thrive. Like Maritain I, she asks the common sense question of what do people need to thrive and to function better, although those are questions that are foreign to standard theories of economics and economic development.

Her *Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach* (Cambridge, 2000) goes beyond the abstractions of economists and demands to know the ethical underpinning of all thought about development planning, beginning with the poor women of India in particular, and she does not buy into the postmodern notion that universals are insensitive to local realities. Human capabilities are what people are capable of doing or becoming in the real world. All policy, including economic policy, has to address that to be ethical.

Such a thesis seems to call for new structures, especially in education, but it especially education towards alternatives.

Ironically, one of Nussbaum's critics was Gayatri Spivak who challenged her premise that "women who are hungry, illiterate, disenfranchised, beaten, raped ... prefer food, schools, votes and integrity of their bodies."

That sounds good, Spivak wrote, "from a powerful tenured academic in a liberal university. But how does she know? This may be her idea of what they should want. In that conviction she may want to teach them this. That is called a "civilizing mission. But she never engages in unmediated grassroots activism
... she will find that the gender practice of the rural poor is quite often in the performance mode, carving out power within a more general scene of pleasure in subjection."

In Nussbaum's rebuttal she said, "In my time working on projects in India, I never met a poor woman who told me she took pleasure in subjection though there may be some who do. I have met countless women who struggle for access to education, employment opportunities, political representation, and shelter from domestic violence."

4.1.2 ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND REFORMIST STRATEGY

Finally I present an example of a reformist strategy.

Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel winner for economics in 2001 and past executive vice-president of the IMF believes that globalization has unrealized potential to eradicate poverty and promote economic growth. His *Globalization and its Discontents* (New York, W. W. Norton. 2002) attributes the failure of the IMF with its profound expertise and vast wealth to fulfill its mandate and actually make matters worse (e.g., the Asian crisis and the failed Russian transformation), to the US treasury's being indentured to US investors.

Stiglitz is a defender of globalization, but he says that IMF decisions were made on economic dogma that thinly veiled special interests. It worked with economists who had no experience or interest in the experience of the developing countries. It's allegiance to creditors made the IMF make outlandish decisions that collapsed the Russian economy and there was also the issue of government officials doing favors in return for executive sinecures in the companies they favored.

Horst Köhler, Managing Director of the IMF, in his address to the Bishops of the Americas, concurred in Stiglitz's evaluation. Among the ethical principles he promoted was accountability for the effect of our actions on other countries, broad international participation that includes local initiative, protection of the
vulnerable, debt relief matched by a society's ability to develop institutional foundations for a modern society, and attentiveness to the voices of the marginalized as John Paul has called for.

Both Köhler and Stiglitz remain optimistic and describe the areas needing reform. Because IMF focuses on the functioning of the international monetary system and on promoting sound macro-economic policies, private capital has become the most important source of financing for growth, productivity and job creation. (Part of their vision is to help countries become participants in global capital markets for the stability of international finance system.

George Soros has suggested a means of giving recipients a greater sense of ownership and participation in the programs that are supposed to benefit them. "The deeply moral theme that runs throughout this very practical [plan] surfaces early and remains visible to the end, where Soros restates his vision of a global open society in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. The issue that concerns him is how to alter the economics of globalization for the benefit of the who human race under conditions of global interconnectedness." 17

Briefly, he suggests operating the IMF somewhat like a philanthropic foundation. Member countries have Special Drawing Rights which are part of their country's official foreign exchange reserves. Allocations of these rights can finance ... public goods on a global scale as well as foster economic, social, and political progress in individual countries. Projects poorer countries propose as worthy of such funding win a place on an approved list of projects created by an independent international board, set up by IMF but free of governmental controls.

Donor countries could use their allocations to fund any project on the approved list but not control the program, (this is part of the reform). An audit

commission, separate from the international board, would monitor and evaluate. Donors' choices would be made public. Soros suggests initially limiting eligible programs to public health, education, information technology or judicial reform.

The rules that Soros suggests aim at keeping the donor country from using the grant for its own political purposes and place the responsibility for executing the program in the hands of locals who are not agents of their government.

Like the system of philanthropic foundations, the prospect of programs vying for donors' funds and competing with one another on the merit of the program eliminates the geo-political motives and local corruption that has impeded the IMF purposes and diverted funds from the people and programs they were to help. "The interest of donors would be subordinated to the needs of the recipients, and recipients would own and manage the development projects, not outsiders.

Nussbaum and Soros are only two voices in a chorus of countless who bring fresh wine for new wineskins.

CONCLUSION

Some would consider such hopes utopian,
But it may be that these persons are not realistic enough,
and that they have not perceived the dynamism of a world which desires to live more fraternally--
a world which, in spite of its ignorance, its mistakes and even its sins, its relapses into barbarism and its wanderings far from the road of salvation,
is, even unawares, taking slow but sure steps towards its Creator.
This road towards a greater humanity requires effort and sacrifice; but suffering itself, accepted for the love of our brethren, favors the progress of the entire human family.

Populorum Progressio